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What picture [tableau] am I going to offer to your eyes? The body of a woman 
cut into pieces [coupe par piece].1  
In “The Levite of Ephraïm” (1762), the minor prose poem which he claimed was his 
“most cherished” of all his works,2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau re-writes a notorious 
episode from the Book of Judges. To recount the original Biblical story,3 Judges 19-
21 tells of a “certain Levite” (Judges 19: 1), living in Mount Ephraïm, whose 
concubine is raped and murdered by members of the Tribe of Benjamin. It is with 
this shocking act of sexual violence that the story really begins because it sets in 
motion a cycle of new acts of mimetic violence: rape, murder, revenge, war, kidnap 
and, finally, murder and rape again. As the Biblical narrative relates, the wronged 
Levite carves his concubine’s dead body into twelve parts (Judges 19: 29) and sends a 
piece to each of the twelve Tribes of Israel – upon which the outraged Israelites, 
seeking revenge, go to war against the Benjaminites in the Battle of Gibeah. 
However, after waging a holy war which reduces the Benjaminites to the point of 
extinction, the Israelites repent and decide that, as a fellow Tribe of Israel, the 
Benjaminites must be allowed to survive. If the Israelites ultimately decide to have 
mercy on the Benjaminites, they are faced with the problem of finding women to 
marry the remaining men of the Tribe and have children with them (Judges 21: 1). 
For the Israelites, the solution is one final act of extreme violence: they kidnap young 
women from the town of Jabesh Gilead, and later from the Feast of Shiloh – killing 
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all the remaining men, women and children – so they can be wedded to the surviving 
men of the Tribe of Benjamin. In this pre-monarchical Israel of the Judges, the 
Biblical narrative reminds us, “there was no king in Israel: every man did that which 
was right in his own eyes” (Judges 21: 24-25).  
 
To be sure, Rousseau’s re-writing of the Levite’s story is by no means a faithful 
recollection of Judges 19-21 but a new textual “dismembering” of the Biblical corpus 
itself which adds to, and subtracts from, its source narrative at key points. It is 
perhaps in these embellishments of, and deviations from, his original source in “The 
Levite of Ephraïm” that we can begin to glimpse his own political theological project 
coming into view. As a number of scholars have observed, he romanticizes and 
sentimentalizes the – minimalist, ambiguous and neutral – narrative record given in 
Judges.4 For Rousseau, the Levite is less a Biblical victim than a tragic Romantic 
hero who, in a revealing addition to the original text, drops dead immediately after 
delivering his plea for justice on behalf of his dead lover. In another key revision, 
Rousseau depicts the Israelites burying him together with the reconstructed body of 
his concubine before they set off to fight the Battle of Gibeah.  
 
If Rousseau embroiders the beginning of the Biblical narrative, though, his most 
substantial addition is a re-writing of its notorious conclusion: what Judges 19-21 
presents as the Benjaminite’s kidnapping and rape of the women at the Feast of 
Shiloh is re-cast as the women of Shiloh’s own – apparently free – decision to marry 
into the Tribe of Benjamin. To make this change possible, Rousseau invents a wholly 
new character: “Axa,” a woman of Shiloh who renounces her betrothed Elmacin upon 
her father’s advice, and agrees to marry a Benjaminite. In the figure of Axa, Rousseau 
seems to offer the tableau, not of an innocent female victim, but of something closer 
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to a free citizen martyr whose sacrifice makes possible the reunification of the 
Israelite body politic: 
Straightaway, as if by a sudden inspiration, all the young women, carried 
along by the example of Axa, imitate her sacrifice [imitent son sacrifice], and 
renouncing their first loves, they deliver themselves to the Benjaminites who 
pursued them. At this touching sight arose a cry of joy in the midst of the 
People. Virgins of Ephraim, through you Benjamin is going to be reborn [va 
renaître]. Blessed be the God of our fathers! There are still virtues in Israel.5  
For Rousseau, however, “The Levite of Ephraïm”’s (triumphant?) peroration 
contains a disturbing irony: what enables the reconstruction of the disparate tribes of 
Israel into one single political body after the murder of the concubine is another body 
of a woman who is (at least figuratively) cut into pieces. It is intriguing that he uses 
exactly the same language to describe Axa’s decision to renounce her lover and marry 
as he earlier used to describe the concubine’s rape and murder. After all, both are left 
“half-dead [demi-morte]” at the hands of the Benjaminites.6 To bring to a closure the 
cycle of violence that began with the mutilation of the Levite’s concubine, Axa must 
politically divide her own body into public and private selves by sacrificing her 
personal desires for the sake of her political obligations: a certain dismemberment 
thus seems to be the blood price of the larger political re-membering which will 
conclude, in the Hebrew Bible, with the formation of a united monarchy under a 
Benjaminite King, Saul. In this sense, “The Levite of Ephraïm” ends where it began: 
“What picture am I going to offer to your eyes? The body of a woman cut into pieces.” 
 
What is the meaning of this dismembered body at the heart of the dismembered 
body that is “The Levite of Ephraïm”? It is a question that, appropriately enough, 
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also divides Rousseau scholars. As we will see, they have read Axa as everything from 
a prototype of the free Republican individual doing her duty for her state to the 
innocent victim of brutal political coercion,7 whereas the text more widely has been 
interpreted as a – positive or negative, sincere, ironic or critical – allegory of the 
passage from the state of nature to the social contract.8 If Rousseau scholarship is 
itself divided over how to interpret the highly ambiguous conclusion of “The Levite of 
Ephraïm,” this divide arguably reflects the larger critical dissensus over Rousseau’s 
political theory more generally, which has (of course) led to it being interpreted as a 
harbinger of everything from authoritarianism and even totalitarianism (Jacob 
Talmon) to liberalism (John Rawls) over the last 250 years or so.9 In many ways, the 
Levite’s battle for the corpse of his concubine could thus be read as a microcosm for 
this larger battle over the political “body” of Rousseau. 
 
This essay offers a new reading of Rousseau’s political theory from “The Levite of 
Ephraïm” to his theory of Civil Religion by focusing on what I want to call his 
political theology of citizen sacrifice. It seeks to challenge, or at least complicate, the 
terms of the orthodox critical reception not only of Rousseau’s political theory but 
arguably of the history of modern political theory more generally in terms of a – 
predominantly secular – debate between negative and positive liberty, liberalism and 
republicanism, freedom from, and submission, to the state,10 by identifying what I 
will posit to be a certain political theological “middle ground” where consent and 
coercion seem to come together in the figure of the religious martyr or sacrificial 
victim. As we will see, Axa’s free, voluntary and yet forced act of self-sacrifice for the 
state is perhaps the paradigm for that ambiguous Rousseauean political subject in 
whom freedom and submission paradoxically coincide – the citizen who is “forced to 
be free,” as Book 1, Chapter 7 of the Social Contract, puts it, or perhaps (as I will 
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argue) even free to be forced.11 To map out my argument, I contend that Rousseau’s 
political theory begins by seeking to prohibit religious sacrifice as something inimical 
to both natural and positive law, but ends up attempting to appropriate or internalize 
this sacrificial economy within the state itself: religious sacrifice must itself be 
“sacrificed” (in the sense of both being put to death and consecrated or preserved) to 
civil sacrifice. If Civil Religion can be read as a kind of machine for making martyrs – 
something designed to produce a good citizen who is willing to die for the state – 
then we are forced to re-think this allegedly “weak,” non-sectarian superstructure of 
Rousseau’s political theory otherwise: what he presents as the civil state’s means of 
domesticating sectarian religious violence is rather a disturbing means of obtaining a 
state monopoly upon sacralized violence. In what follows, then, I offer an anatomy of 
the (dismembered) body of the citizen martyr across Rousseau’s literary, political 
and philosophical corpus. Why, to return to “The Levite of Ephraïm,” do we find a 
body cut into pieces at the primal scene of the state?  
 
Rousseau on Sacrifice 
In his career-long critique of institutional religion, which stretches from the 
Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (1755), through Julie or the 
New Eloise (1761) and Émile or On Education (1762) up to The Social Contract 
(1762), Rousseau consistently condemns religious sacrifice. To put his position 
bluntly, sacrifice – and more precisely the act of self-sacrifice or martyrdom for one’s 
religious beliefs – is against both natural and positive law and thus (almost) never 
justified. If Rousseau advances a series of arguments against sacrifice – ontological, 
ethical and political – I argue that he never entirely rules out, and indeed even 
glorifies, one specific form of sacrifice, namely, the political sacrifice of the citizen’s 
life for the good of the state whether it takes the form of risking one’s life or dying in 
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warfare or dying under a sentence of capital punishment. In a logic that we will 
witness at work throughout his political theory, Rousseau excludes what he sees as 
the unnatural and uncivil theology of religious sacrifice or martyrdom from the state 
only to re-integrate it into the state in his theory of the citizen. What, then, are the 
roots of this new political theology of citizen sacrifice? 
 
To begin at the ground zero of his philosophical anthropology, Rousseau’s account of 
“natural” man in the Second Discourse follows such predecessors as Hobbes, Locke 
and Spinoza by insisting that any human being who is willing to kill themselves (or 
even another) for whatever reason is almost always acting against nature. It would 
seem that man’s classic desire for  “self-preservation” (amour-de-soi) – coupled with 
his essential pity at the suffering of others – renders self-killing simply unnatural.12 If 
citizens in modern society all too easily bemoan their existence – “and some even 
deprive themselves of it as far as they are able” regardless of divine or human laws – 
the Second Discourse revealingly contrasts the modern citizen with the beau savage 
in the state of nature who, allegedly, knows nothing of suicide. In Rousseau’s words, 
“I ask whether anyone has ever heard tell that it so much as occurred to a Savage, 
who is free, to complain of life and to kill himself?”13  
 
For Rousseau, a human being does retain the right to take his or her life in certain 
exceptional circumstances but they are very much the exceptions that prove the rule 
of self-preservation. It is worth remembering here the amusing caveat scriptor that 
he issues to any authors tempted to commit the inductive fallacy in Idea of Method 
in the Composition of a Book (1745): “What! Because two or three madmen kill 
themselves daily in London, the English do not fear death?.”14 If a wise man may be 
entitled to take his own life “when nature or fortune distinctly conveys to him the 
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order to depart,”15 he argues in the Letter to Voltaire (1756), this unfortunate 
individual is vastly outnumbered by the many who natural law clearly commands to 
live. “In the ordinary course of things,” Rousseau writes, “human life is not, all in all, 
a bad gift, whatever may be the evils with which it is strewn; and while it is not 
always an evil to die, it is very seldom one to live.”16  
 
If Saint Preux famously advances a powerful set of arguments in favour of self-killing 
in Julie or the New Eloise (1761), his correspondent Milord Édouard warns him that, 
in addition to being a sin, suicide is also against positive law.17 Yet, what is arguably 
most interesting about this particular moment in their debate is that it circles around 
a celebrated classical example which (as we will see momentarily), has revealing 
implications for Rousseau’s political theology of sacrifice more widely, namely, the 
suicide of Socrates by judicial order as reported by Plato in the Phaedo. In response 
to Saint Preux’s claim that Socrates’ death vindicates his claim for the right to 
dispose of his own life, Édouard replies that, unlike his correspondent, Socrates 
actually obeyed the law: “The laws, the laws. Young man!  Does the wise man scorn 
them? Guiltless Socrates, out of respect for them was unwilling to leave prison. You 
do not hesitate to violate them in order to leave life unjustly, and you ask: what harm 
am I doing?.”18 
 
What, finally, does Rousseau’s own theory of natural religion – which famously 
claims that knowledge of God proceeds from our observation of natural phenomena 
rather than religious dogma – have to say about the theology of religious sacrifice? 
For the Savoyard Vicar in Émile (1762), sacrificial theology belongs to that species of 
dogmatic or artificial religion which perverts our natural pity for the suffering of 
others: “I see in it only the crimes of men and the miseries of mankind.”19 “If artificial 
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religion “depicted for us only a God who is angry, jealous, vengeful, partial, one who 
hates men, a God of war and of battles, always ready to destroy and strike down 
[foudroyer], always speaking of torments and  suffering, and boasting even of 
punishing the innocent,” he goes on, then “my heart would not be attracted toward 
this terrible God, and I would take care not to give up the natural Religion for this 
one.”20 In his Letter to Christophe de Beaumont, Archbishop of Paris (1763), written 
the year after Émile, Rousseau goes on to offer what is perhaps the single most 
compelling formulation of his critique of religious sacrifice:  
I neither say nor think there is no good Religion on earth. But I do say, and it 
is only too true, that there is none among those that are or have been 
dominant that has not cruelly wounded humanity. All parties have tormented 
their brothers, all have offered to God sacrifices of human blood. Whatever the 
source of these contradictions, they exist. Is it a crime to want to eliminate 
them [vouloir les ôter]?21 
 
In many ways, Rousseau’s political theology of citizen sacrifice really begins with the 
question he begs in the Letter to Beaumont: what exactly might it mean to 
“eliminate” religious sacrifices to God? It is possible, as Karant observes, to find one, 
albeit disturbing, answer to this question in the philosopher’s claim in the Letter to 
d’Alembert on the Theatre (1758) that the only way to resist dogmatic fanaticism – in 
this case the “fanaticism” of Islam – is not with reason but with a species of what we 
might almost call counter-fanaticism: “Once fanaticism exists, I see only one way left 
to stop its progress; that is to use its own arms against it,” he writes, “One must leave 
philosophy behind, close the Books, take the sword, and punish the impostors.”22 As 
we are beginning to see, he deploys a range of arguments to put religious sacrifice to 
the sword, but arguably his most remarkable position is to (quite literally) take hold 
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of that sword for the civil state. To return to the classical example Rousseau recruits 
to the case against suicide in Julie, I find it telling that Socrates’ obedience to 
Athenian law did not in fact prohibit his suicide but rather authorized his death at 
his own hands: the Greek philosopher effectively becomes his own executioner by 
drinking hemlock in fulfilment of his sentence to death by poisoning.23 Yet, this 
classical scene of state-sanctioned self-killing is by no means an isolated moment in 
Rousseau’s corpus, but one which recurs serially across a range of texts. If Milord 
Édouard gives a point-by-point rebuttal of Saint Preux’s claim to the right to suicide 
in Julie, it is rarely remarked that one of his key arguments against suicide is that it 
constitutes, not so much a waste of life, as the waste of a death that should properly 
be reserved for acts of self-sacrifice in a political cause: “Where is that virtuous 
patriot who refuses to sell his blood to a foreign prince because he must shed it only 
for his country,” Édouard asks, “and who now, a desperate man, means to shed it 
against the express injunction of the laws?.”24 In the Social Contract (1762), and 
particularly in the elliptical concluding chapter, “Of Civil Religion,” we can begin to 
see more clearly how Rousseau transforms the archaic theology of religious sacrifice 
into this new political theology of citizen sacrifice. 
 
Rousseau on “Civil Religion” (1762) 
In many ways, Rousseau’s theory of Civil Religion is now so familiar that it scarcely 
needs further rehearsal, but what is much less recognized is the extent to which this 
“purely civil profession of faith”25 is also designed to make possible the ultimate 
sacrifice that the citizen (allegedly) owes the state: death. To neutralize the threat 
posed to the state by religious violence – and particularly religious sacrifice – I argue 
that Rousseau again internalizes a sacrificial economy within the civil state itself. For 
Rousseau, what is called “Civil Religion” is, despite its nominally “weak” reputation, 
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a religion of blood sacrifice which is designed to make possible the citizen’s 
surrender of their life to the state. In a sacrificial logic that is embedded in 
Rousseau’s Civil Religion, the citizen must be willing to voluntarily give up their 
individual life to preserve their greater political life. Why, then, must a good citizen 
become something close to a martyr?  
 
To trace the origins of his theory of Civil Religion, we might be able to detect a shift 
here from Rousseau’s earlier work – which warns against the kind of Hobbesian 
“ends-justifies-the-means” consequentialism that seeks to sacrifice the individual to 
the collective – to the later work, which constantly invokes the necessity of individual 
sacrifice to preserve the civil state. It is his position in the Discourse on Political 
Economy (1755), for example, that the civil state exists to preserve the lives of its 
individual members rather than the other way around. As he famously argues, “If we 
are told that it is good that a single citizen perish for all, I will admire this statement 
from the mouth of a worthy and virtuous patriot who voluntarily and out of duty 
consecrates himself to die for his country’s safety [qui se consacre volontairement et 
par devoir à la mort pour le salut de son pays].” Yet, “if what is meant is that the 
government is permitted to sacrifice one innocent person for the safety of the many,” 
he goes on, “I hold this to be one of the most execrable maxims that tyranny ever 
invented.”26 If Rousseau’s condemnation of sacrificial violence seems categorical 
here, we can again observe a curious exception to this rule – the self-sacrifice of the 
“virtuous patriot.” In “Of Civil Religion,” what is at stake is precisely the question of 
how the “innocent person,” who is wrongly and forcibly sacrificed by the state, can be 
converted into the “patriot,” who rightly and voluntarily consecrates himself to die 
for his country’s safety.  
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For the Rousseau of the Geneva Manuscript, we can already begin to see that Civil 
Religion not only marks the passage from sectarian faith to a civil faith but from a 
classic sacrificial theology to a modern political theology of citizen sacrifice. To turn 
to a remarkable passage which was omitted from the published version of the Social 
Contract, he describes Civil Religion as indispensable to a civil society not simply 
because it instils within the citizen a love of country or respect for the law but 
because it inculcates the ethic of citizen sacrifice without which no state can survive: 
As soon as men live in society, they must have a Religion that keeps them 
there. A people has never subsisted nor will subsist without Religion, and if it 
were not given one, it would make one itself or soon be destroyed. In every 
state that can require its members to sacrifice their lives, anyone who does not 
believe in the afterlife is necessarily a coward or a madman.27  
If Rousseau argues that all religions seem to require “sacrifices of human blood” by 
their adherents in the Letter to Beaumont, he here reverses this causality: the citizen 
requires a species of religious belief in order to be able to perform the acts of sacrifice 
which are essential to the continuing survival of every state. In Rousseau’s political 
theory, we might suspect that Civil Religion is invented precisely to meet this 
sacrificial demand by the state: this belief in a civic species of “afterlife” –  a political 
life which is, like the General Will, greater than the sum of the lives of the individual 
citizens who compose it – induces the citizen to lay down their lives to protect and 
defend that state.  
 
If we can now turn to Rousseau’s actual theory of Civil Religion in detail, the 
philosopher famously presents this civil profession of faith as a kind of proto-
Hegelian synthesis between three existing species of religion, which, at least 
according to his verdict, each possess broadly symmetrical strengths and 
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weaknesses. To quickly unpack his taxonomy, Rousseau speaks of: (1) the Religion of 
“Man,” a proxy for Christianity, which is spiritually pure but too personal, 
otherworldly and apathetic to be able to defend the civil state against its enemies; (2) 
the Religion of “the Citizen,” which instills man with the spirit of patriotism 
necessary to fight, but is too empty, ceremonial and intolerant of other states and 
faiths and, finally, (3) the Religion of “the Priest,” a surrogate for Roman 
Catholicism, which creates a fatal fissure or division between Christ and Caesar, civil 
and religious orders, and potentially leads to the breakdown of civil society. For 
Rousseau, Civil Religion must be a kind of political fusion or aggregate of the 
Religions of (1) Man and (2) the Citizen, which seeks to overcome the divisions 
inherent in (3) the Religion of the Priest, by reconciling individual freedom and civil 
obligation, private expression and public worship, pacifism and militarism. In his 
famous description, all citizens must profess their faith in a civil religion with a 
minimal set of basic dogmas to which believers of all religions can subscribe: “The 
existence of the powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and provident Deity”; 
“the life to come”; “the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked” and “the 
sanctity of the social Contract and the Laws.”28 
 
What makes possible the – apparently bloodless – philosophical coup of Civil 
Religion over the respective religions of Man, the Priest and the Citizen? To retrace 
Rousseau’s dialectical steps more slowly, we can begin to see that the common 
denominator between his two principal antagonists – Man and the Citizen – is, once 
again, a willingness to die. It may appear that the religions of Man and the Citizen 
out of which Civil Religion is formed are diametrically opposed – as internal versus 
external, private versus public, peace-seeking versus warlike and so on – but what all 
their believers share (whether through sheer resignation or total commitment makes 
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no effective difference here), and what makes possible their eventual synthesis, is an 
unconditional embrace of death for their civil states. As Rousseau observes, citizens 
who practice the religion of Man “will march to battle without hesitation” even if 
“they know better how to die than to win”29 whereas citizens who profess the religion 
of the state will readily believe that “[t]o die for one’s country is to be a martyr.”30 If 
Rousseau undoubtedly believes that there is much more at stake to Civil Religion 
than simply the desire to die – a good citizen does not want to fight and die for its 
own sake but rather to win and carry on living – what is equally clear from “Of Civil 
Religion” is that (again in almost proto-Hegelian terms) this unconditional 
willingness to die is an essential pre-condition for the continuing existence of any 
republic – to the point where anyone who is not willing to give their life should be 
automatically excluded from that republic.31 In this sense, Rousseau is entirely 
justified in placing what we might call a certain love of death after love of life or law 
as the last of the articles of faith of Civil Religion: 
There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith the articles of which it is up 
to the Sovereign to fix, not precisely as dogmas of Religion, but as sentiments 
of sociability; without which it is impossible to be either a good Citizen or a 
loyal subject. Without being able to oblige anyone to believe them, the 
Sovereign may banish from the State anyone who does not believe them; it 
can banish them, not as impious, but as unsociable, as incapable of sincerely 
loving the laws, justice, and, if need be of sacrificing his life to his duty 
[d’immoler au besoin sa vie à son devoir].32 
 
In the more than 250 years since its inception, Rousseau’s theory of Civil Religion 
has been read as everything from a harbinger of state republicanism or even 
totalitarianism (which completes the Hobbesian project of constructing a total state 
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fusing religious and civil authority in the figure of a strong civil sovereign) to a 
precursor to the liberal state (which continues the work of Locke in effectively 
creating a weak, neutral public space by privatizing religious confession).33 It is still 
possible to witness this kind of debate in contemporary Rousseau scholarship on 
Civil Religion. On the one hand, Christopher Bertram describes a relatively tolerant 
Rousseau for whom citizens publicly profess a minimal faith whilst reserving the 
right to believe whatever they wish in private.34 On the other, Joshua Karant presents 
a potentially more authoritarian Rousseau for whom citizens are compelled to 
believe in their civil religion on pain of expulsion or even death.35 Yet, arguably 
Ronald Beiner is closest to my own position here when he describes Rousseau’s Civil 
Religion as a “paradox rather than a proposal,” which seeks to square the circle 
between liberalism and republicanism – to which I would only add that this aporia is 
not a mere error or deviation in his corpus so much as the animating tension of his 
political theory.36 To place the philosopher’s sacrificial political theology in this 
context, I thus suspect that there is an excluded middle in the debate between the 
absolutist and the liberal Rousseau: what emerges in Civil Religion is neither the 
birth pangs of state totalitarianism nor of liberal democracy so much as a certain 
sacrificial counter-fanaticism. For Rousseau, Civil Religion seems constructed to 
neutralize the threat posed by religious violence – instituting a set of classic 
oppositions between individual freedom and political obligation, private and public 
worship and so on – but this allegedly “liberal” gesture is again only accomplished by 
incorporating religious violence into the state in the form of a political theology of 
civil sacrifice: the good citizen is entitled to believe what they like but, as the text 
makes unarguably clear, they must be willing to die for their (civil) religion. If he is 
himself notoriously vague on what his Civil Religion might look like in practice, we 
can nonetheless detect certain echoes of this sacrificial political theology scattered 
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throughout his more concrete political policies and programmes – such as in his 
theory of self-authorizing sovereign killing in the Social Contract or his preference 
for civilian militias over professional standing armies in his Considerations on the 
Government of Poland (1772).37 In each case, Rousseau founds the sovereign right to 
violence – whether it be the martial right to wage war or the civil right to inflict 
punishment and death – in the citizen’s own act of self-sacrifice:  
The social treaty has the preservation of the contracting parties as its end. 
Whoever wills the end, also wills the means, and these means are inseparable 
from certain risks and even certain losses. Whoever wants to preserve his life 
at the expense of others ought also to give it up for them when necessary. 
Now, the Citizen is no longer judge of the danger the law wills him to risk, and 
when the Prince has said to him, it is expedient to the State that you die, he 
ought to die.38  
 
Rousseau on “The Levite of Ephraïm” (1762) 
In Rousseau’s corpus, what I am calling the political theology of citizen sacrifice 
takes many forms – Socrates, the citizens of Sparta who are reared to fight and die in 
battle, Lucretia, whose self-sacrifice in The Death of Lucretia gives rise to the Roman 
Republic and even Julie herself who dies, in the words of her minister, “as a 
martyr”39 – but it arguably finds its most graphic representation in a figure who has 
no exact parallel in his work: Axa in “The Levite of Ephraïm.”40 To be sure, 
Rousseau’s prose poem has been read in many different ways, but one of the few 
things that scholars seem to agree upon is that it is an allegory for the (variously free, 
consensual, ironic or violent) passage from the state of nature to society: Thomas 
Kavanagh reads it as the story of a community discovering its unanimous general 
will, Elizabeth Wingrove depicts Axa’s marriage as a microcosm of the paradox of 
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republican freedom whereas Mira Morgenstern sees the latter as the kind of sham 
political foundation described in the Second Discourse.41 It even contains, as 
Kavanagh observes, many of the major dramatis personae from the Social Contract: 
the citizen (the Levite); the General Will (the Tribes of Israel), the criminal or public 
enemy (the Benjaminites) and the figure of the Legislator (the old man of Leborah).42 
As I have argued elsewhere, Rousseau’s reading can also be seen as a self-conscious 
contribution to a longer tradition of modern political readings– stretching from 
Grotius to Locke – all of which interpret the Book of Judges as describing the 
historical transition from the rule of the “judges” (Jephthah, Samson, etc.) to the rule 
of the kings (Saul, David).43 If it seems unlikely that a barbaric story of rape, murder 
and revenge from the Hebrew Bible could provide a model for the Social Contract – 
still less the allegedly weak dogmas described in “Of Civil Religion” – then we might 
also recall here Jonathan Marks’ intriguing observation that Rousseau sees Judaism 
as occupying the very middle ground between Republicanism and Christianity – 
between the this-worldly religion of the Citizen and the other-worldly religion of Man 
– that, as we have seen, he wants to claim for Civil Religion itself: “Judaism as 
Rousseau presents it – unlike the classical republic – embodies everything Rousseau 
finds good in religion without – unlike Christianity – destroying what Rousseau finds 
good in republican politics.”44 In my own (somewhat less ameliatory) reading, Axa 
occupies the altogether more disturbing middle ground between Christianity and 
Republicanism described earlier in our own discussion of Civil Religion: a political 
theology of citizen sacrifice which both “religions” share. What, then, makes it 
possible to read Axa’s free act of consent to her forced marriage as a kind of 




To grasp what is taking place in Rousseau’s re-writing of the Book of Judges (a story 
which begins and ends with the tableau of a corps démembré), I recall that it is an 
iteration of a persistent trope in his corpus: a dis-membered and/or re-membered 
body. It is now commonplace to read the scene where the Levite sends the body parts 
of his concubine as a “message” to the Tribes of Israel as a dramatization of his 
theory of language and, more precisely, of the alienation wrought by the transition 
from oral to written culture. As he remarks in the Essay on the Origins of Language, 
the Levite’s unwritten message could never generate the same visceral response in 
modern France that it did in ancient Israel: “Nowadays, it would have been turned 
into lawsuits, debates, perhaps even jokes, it would have dragged on, and the most 
ghastly crime would finally have gone unpunished.”45 However, what is less noted is 
that he also mobilizes the same trope of dismemberment – and of self-
dismemberment – throughout his corpus, to other, more productive, ends. To take 
the most famous example from Chapter 2, Book 2 of the Social Contract, Rousseau 
argues that political theory’s attempts to divide the sovereign body into executive and 
legislative powers can be compared to the trick of a fairground magician pretending 
to saw a human body in two:   
Japanese conjurors [charlartans] are said to carve up a child’s body before 
the spectator’s eyes, then, throwing all its members into the air one after the 
other, they make the child fall back down all alive and reassembled [tout 
rassemblé]. That is, more or less, what our politician’s tricks [les tours de 
gobelet] are like: having dismembered the social body [démembré le corps 
social] by a sleight-of-hand [prestige] worthy of the fairground, they put the 
pieces back together no one knows how.46 
If Rousseau often deploys the analogy of the indivisibility of the physical body to 
prove the indivisibility of the body politic – it is no more believable that “an arm can 
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be injured or cut off and the pain of it not conveyed to the head,” he writes, than the 
General Will would “agree to have any member of the State…injure or destroy 
another”47 – he also occasionally mobilizes the trope of (self-) dismemberment to the 
opposite effect: we can only preserve the life of the whole body – whether it be the 
natural body or the body politic – by amputating a part of that body. In Julie, Saint 
Preux’s defense of the right to suicide compares killing oneself to cutting off a 
wounded limb – “He who is unable to deliver himself from a painful life through a 
prompt death is like the man who prefers to let a wound fester rather than entrust it 
to the salutary knife of a surgeon”48 – whereas the Second Discourse extends the 
same analogy to the political sphere in its description of voluntary servitude at the 
birth of society: “even the wise saw that they had to make up their mind to sacrifice 
one part of their freedom to preserve the other, as a wounded man has his arm cut 
off to save the rest of his Body.”49 
 
For Rousseau, “The Levite of Ephraïm” re-iterates what we might call this sacrificial 
biopolitics of dis- and re-membering in which the body natural or political must give 
up some part of itself to preserve the integrity of the whole. It is even tempting to 
read the prose poem as the philosopher’s own rendition of the Japanese conjuror’s 
magic trick. After all, Rousseau’s story, too, begins with a set of body parts being 
thrown into the air (in the form of the rape, murder and dissection of the concubine) 
and ends with their magical, albeit symbolic, reunification after the re-entry of the 
Benjaminites into the body politic of Israel. Yet, in this version of the magic trick, of 
course, something is missing when the pieces fall back to earth: what binds the body 
politic back together is the sacrifice of one part of itself to the whole. To return to 
Rousseau’s own embellishments to Judges 19-21 one final time, Axa voluntarily gives 
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up her life with her betrothed Elmacin upon her father’s advice to marry one of the 
remaining men of the tribe of Benjamin:  
Axa kisses his head and sighs without responding; but finally, raising her eyes, 
she encounters those of her venerable father. They said more than his mouth: 
she makes her choice [elle prend son parti]. Her weak and trembling voice 
scarcely pronounces in a weak and last farewell, the name of Elmacin, at 
whom she dares not look, and instantly turning around half-dead [demi-
morte], she falls into the arms of the Benjaminite.50 
If the original Biblical story begins and ends with the Benjaminites perpetrating an 
act of sexual violence on a female body outwith their own tribe, Rousseau’s crucial 
interpellation that Axa consents to her forced marriage seems to break this vicious 
circle: what was, at best, a story of archaic crime and punishment and, at worst, of 
permanent anarchic sexual violence inflicted upon the female body is arguably 
turned into another economy of citizen sacrifice, martyrdom and reward. In a 
symbolic act of self-dismemberment which (as Rousseau precisely puts it) leaves her 
“half-dead,” Axa’s renunciation of Elmacin and submission to the Benjaminite 
sacrifices her private body to the preservation of her public body and thus makes 
possible the reunification of the Israelites: 
Straightaway, as if by a sudden inspiration, all the young women, carried 
along by the example of Axa, imitate her sacrifice, and renouncing their first 
loves, they deliver themselves to the Benjaminites who pursued them. At this 
touching sight arose a cry of joy in the midst of the People. Virgins of 
Ephraim, through you Benjamin is going to be reborn. Blessed be the God of 
our fathers! There are still virtues in Israel.51 
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If Axa is to be read as a theological prototype of the political citizen, however, we 
need to confront one particular issue which would seem, at first blush, to trouble or 
even contradict this interpretation. To put it bluntly, Axa is a woman – and the 
philosopher makes clear on numerous occasions (the Social Contract, Emile and so 
on) that women are not to be regarded as citizens. It is, moreover, precisely because 
women are deemed physically incapable of fighting in battle that they are excluded 
from participation in the political sphere and restricted to the (at best indirectly 
political) domestic realm of marriage and child-rearing. As Rousseau’s rhetorical 
questions on pregnancy in Emile reveal, women are supposedly incapable by nature 
of performing the sacrificial function that he deems essential to citizenship: “Will a 
woman abruptly and regularly change her life without peril and risk? Will she be 
nurse today and warrior tomorrow?”52 However, Joel Schwarz, Elizabeth Wingrove, 
Tamela Ice and many other scholars have, nonetheless, canvassed for a much more 
complex relationship between the woman and the citizen in Rousseau’s political 
imaginary: what we find in Julie, Lucretia, the Spartan mothers who rejoice at the 
deaths of their sons in battle and, finally, Axa would seem to be a more positive 
model of female civic virtue which blurs the boundaries between the mother and the 
warrior.53 For Elizabeth Wingrove, who arguably offers the most detailed reading of 
“The Levite of Ephraïm” from this perspective, Rousseau’s sexual politics and 
political Republicanism could even be said to mutually constitute each other: “sexual 
interaction is not like political interaction, nor are its identities preparatory in the 
sense of being prior to or separate from politics,” she argues, “rather, the story of the 
Levite discloses how republican practices consist in the proper performance of 
masculinity and femininity.”54 In Wingrove’s reading, Axa is neither a domestic non-
political figure whose identity mimetically mirrors the political order, nor even a 
proto-political figure whose identity prepares for the advent of the political, but an 
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essentially political actor whose sexual sacrifice just is already a form of political 
sacrifice: “how Rousseau organizes a libidinal economy is how he organizes 
sovereignty, and the tortured version of consent we find here is exemplary of a 
republican world in which agreement to be ruled means that ‘no’ sometimes means 
‘yes’.”55 
What, then, are we supposed to make of Axa’s moment of political death and rebirth, 
of dismemberment and re-memberment? Is it an act of (self-)enslavement, of mass 
political rape or enforced marriage of a non-citizen? Or a genuinely free decision 
taken by a citizen to do her duty to her political community? It seems difficult to 
place Axa into any of the ready-made binary subject positions (man/woman, 
warrior/mother, citizen/slave) which already populate Rousseau’s political universe: 
she is simultaneously not quite free enough to be a genuine republican citizen but, 
nonetheless, too free to be one of the voluntary slaves condemned in Book 1, Chapter 
4 of the Social Contract, “On Slavery.”56 As a number of scholars have observed, 
Axa’s decision is clearly depicted as a free act of “sacrifice” rather than of the kind of 
(self-) enslavement that he elsewhere deems to be unnatural: Rousseau’s text raises 
the possibility that Axa and the other women of Shiloh will become slaves to their 
Benjaminite husbands – “What, they cried vehemently, will the daughters of Israel 
be subjected and treated as slaves beneath the eyes of the Lord?” – but goes on to 
emphatically reject it by giving the women a free choice whether to marry or not.57 To 
stick as closely as possible to the difficulty of Rousseau’s own text here – rather than 
making it fit pre-existing categories –I would thus prefer to stress the genuine 
ambivalence in his representation of Axa which troubles any attempt to reduce her to 
either martyr or scapegoat, political actor or rape victim: Axa’s decision to marry is 
indeed presented as free and unforced – her father does implore her to do her duty 
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as a daughter (“fais ton devoir ma fille”)  but neither he, her lover, nor even the 
Benjaminites could be said to physically coerce her into marriage – yet, at the same 
time, the philosopher’s description of a woman falling “half-dead” into the arms of a 
man is hardly redolent of the free act of a strong political agent either.58 If Rousseau 
scholars tend to read Axa as either the prototype of the free individual voluntarily 
doing her duty to her state or an innocent victim of brutal political coercion, as we 
will see momentarily, I again prefer to argue that she occupies precisely the middle 
ground between freedom and force – consent and violence – which is the proper 
territory of Rousseau’s own political theology of citizen sacrifice. In a reversal of his 
notorious depiction of the political subject as someone who must be “forced to be 
free,”59 we might even argue that Rousseau’s “The Levite of Ephraïm” describes a 
subject who is paradoxically free to be forced – a subject who freely chooses to 
sacrifice her freedom, and even or especially her life, to the preservation of the life of 
the state.60  
In the last couple of decades, Rousseau scholars have begun to detect the same kind 
of divide between broadly liberal and authoritarian politics in “The Levite of 
Ephraïm” as they have in Rousseau’s political philosophy more generally: what was 
once regarded as little more than a psycho-biographical curiosity within Rousseau’s 
corpus is now read as everything from an allegory of the formation of an ideal 
political community founded on consent to a nightmarish parody of the social 
contract which reveals that it is underwritten by coercion.61 It is striking that Axa’s 
decision to marry also polarizes contemporary readers into something like pro- and 
anti-Benjaminite camps in a kind of symbolic re-fighting of the Battle of Gibeah. On 
the one extreme, Caroline Weber argues that she is simply “robbed of her 
inclinations and passed between men for the sake of national security.”62 On the 
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other, Michael S. Kochin states that she is taking a heroic “free” act of “renouncing 
inclination for duty.”63 Yet, we can arguably detect the same curious excluded middle 
in this debate as we have throughout Rousseau’s reception history: what is presented 
as a simple choice between liberalism and absolutism in his political theory obscures 
the sacrificial core at the heart of his liberalism. To read Axa and the other women of 
Shiloh in this political theological context, they can be seen as paradigmatic 
Rousseauean citizens not because they represent either freedom or sacrifice but 
rather because, in Wingrove’s words, they best embody the republican paradox that 
freedom just is sacrifice: “they are instead exemplars of citizenly decision making in 
the context of an unalterable, constant, and supremely sovereign general will, where 
even or especially the citizens' lives must be available for sacrifice.”64 For Rousseau, 
Axa is certainly at liberty to decide her own fate – in the negative sense that she is 
not subject to any external interference – but what is more crucial to recognize here 
is that the philosopher has already framed what we might call her “positive” liberty 
as a binary choice – not between two alternative forms of life, between the life of 
freedom or submission, of the state of nature or the social contract – but rather 
between two violent deaths. If Axa chooses, she can put her public self to death for 
the sake of her private one (by marrying her betrothed but guaranteeing the 
extinction of the united Israelite community of which she is a member) or, as she 
finally decides to do, put her private self to death for the sake of her public one (by 
marrying a member of the Tribe of Benjamin at the cost of renouncing her own 
personal life and desires) – but, either way, she dies. In Rousseau’s political 





In drawing this essay to a close, I return to the question with which we began: why 
does Rousseau present the tableau of the body of a woman “cut into pieces” at the 
allegorical birthplace of the social contract in the “The Levite of Ephraïm”? To be 
sure, Rousseau’s tableau is ambiguous enough to suggest many possible 
interpretations of Axa – innocent victim of patriarchy, Girardian scapegoat, the 
corpse at a Freudian primal crime scene– but what I have argued here is that the 
dismembered body perversely becomes the paradigm of citizenship as such under the 
social contract. If Axa’s divided body is something like the archetype of Rousseau’s 
political citizen, then it becomes necessary to perform another critical deconstruction 
– yet another dismemberment – of the corpse of Rousseau’s own political ontology 
and, particularly, his philosophical anthropology: self-preservation is intimately 
intertwined with self-destruction, love of life with a certain love of death. What if the 
social contract is less a rational quid pro quo based upon a universal desire for self-
preservation and more a sacrificial cult?  
To recapitulate my own hypothesis: Rousseau proposes many different solutions to 
what he sees as the violent or atavistic theology of religious sacrifice – by variously 
contending that putting oneself (or another) to death on religious grounds is cruel, 
artificial and contrary to natural, religious and positive laws – but perhaps his most 
ingenious answer to this problem is to secure what we might call a state monopoly 
upon sacrifice. In order to neutralize the existential threat posed by religious violence 
to his putative state, Rousseau politicizes that violence in the form of a political 
theology of citizen sacrifice which variously expresses itself in civil punishment, 
warfare but most fundamentally in the citizen’s very accession to the social contract 
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itself: the civil sovereign becomes the only “god” who can legitimately demand 
human sacrifices from his believers. 
For Rousseau, this sacrificial political theology can be traced from the Second 
Discourse to the Social Contract and beyond. To start with, his general prohibition 
against self-killing issued in such texts as the Second Discourse, Julie, Emile and so 
on always conceals a specific loophole or get-out clause which permits and even 
glorifies killing oneself for the state. If he also presents his theory of Civil Religion as 
a means of domesticating the violence of sectarian religions which are incarnated in 
sacrificial theology, we have seen that this allegedly weak profession of faith again 
contains a political theology which is explicitly designed to create a citizen who is 
capable of “sacrificing his life to his duty.”65 In the same way as Axa falls “half-dead” 
into the arms of the Benjaminite, the good citizen falls half-dead into the arms of the 
state: they have already formally promised to give up their individual lives for that 
state as a condition for their citizenship. 
If Rousseau’s political theology of citizen sacrifice has a long afterlife, its most 
immediate legacy is arguably to the French Revolution and, more precisely, to the 
martyrological political theology of a figure such as Maximilien de Robespierre. It is 
already well documented that the Revolutionary Cult of the Supreme Being (1794) is 
a kind of performative (mis-)reading of Rousseau’s theory of Civil Religion, but what 
is less recognized is the extent to which it also re-activates the latter’s sacrificial 
political theology. For Robespierre, whose speeches mobilize many of the same 
Greek, Roman and Christian martryological tropes as Rousseau himself, republican 
citizenship is, above all, a sacrificial citizenship in which the willingness to die for the 
state becomes the ultimate proof of revolutionary virtue.66 In his final speech to the 
National Convention – delivered less than 48 hours before his own dismemberment 
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at the guillotine –Robespierre even declares that, in a certain sense, he is already 
“demi-morte”: “I am a living martyr [martyr vivant]’ of the Republic.”67 
 
What, finally, does Rousseau’s political theology of citizen sacrifice bequeath to the 
theory and praxis of political modernity? It is well-documented that modern 
genealogies of political thought – and in particular exponents of liberal or republican 
theories of freedom – are often motivated by a shared suspicion of the religious past 
as, at best, a simple irrelevance to the articulation of republican civil virtue and, at 
worst, a dangerously anti-liberal threat to civil authority.68 At the same time, though, 
Rousseau’s political theology has not simply disappeared: “Civil Religion” has 
instead become the proper name for a peculiarly North American modern political 
theology in which the citizen’s willingness to give their lives for the state in war or 
peace is deemed to be the “glue” that binds us together. For the sociologist of religion 
Robert Bellah, whose classic essay “Civil Religion in America” (1967) arguably begins 
this tradition, Rousseau’s political theological project can be extended into a reading 
of the North American political tradition from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address of 1863 
to Kennedy’s Inaugural Address in 1961. In the same way, Bellah also repeats the 
sacrificial core at the heart of Civil Religion: where Rousseau’s “Levite of Ephraïm” 
had told the story of how citizen sacrifice makes possible the reunification of Israel 
after civil war, Bellah contends that, from the American Civil War onwards, U.S. 
political discourse increasingly privileges themes of “death, sacrifice, and rebirth.”69  
 
In installing a body cut to pieces at the primal scene of the state, Rousseau also sets 
in motion a political theology of citizen sacrifice that persists to the present day. It is 
only by returning to the founding signatures of modern liberalism –Hobbes, Locke, 
Spinoza, Rousseau – that we can perhaps begin to understand why sacrifice may be 
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symptomatic of, rather than a historical precursor to, or a violent deviation from, the 
liberal project. As the contemporary legal theorist Paul W. Khan has argued, we can 
only put liberalism “in its place” by recognizing that modern nation-states arose as 
“grand institutional structures for the sacrifice of their citizens to the idea of the 
necessity of the state’s continued existence.”70 For Kahn, a political theology of 
citizen sacrifice, indeed of citizen filicide, rather than some mythical social contract 
can even be said to lie at the very origin of the modern liberal state itself: 
The originary act rests on the faith that through death is life, the central idea 
of every sacrifice. There can be no nation of Israel as a community sustaining 
itself through history until families are willing to sacrifice their children for 
the existence of the state. They do so not because of a promise of their own 
well-being, as in Hobbes’ idea of the social contract, but because they have 
faith that the state holds forth an ultimate meaning. Sacrifice is the 
appearance of the sacred as a historical phenomenon.71 
If Kahn’s neo-Schmittean claim that even modern liberal democracies demand from 
their citizens the right to kill and be killed has been accused of promulgating an 
aggressively anti-liberal political theology,72 we might reply that his argument is but 
the logical extension of Rousseau’s own political theology of civil sacrifice: it seems 
that we are all Axa now. What is “The Levite of Ephraïm,” after all, if not a story of 
how the nation of Israel sustains itself through history via the sacrifice of the child 
for the existence of the state? In our modern political theology of citizen sacrifice, 
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